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The Question for The Modernization Theory
Does Democracy Really Influence the Economic Development?
Abstract

In general, democra2c countries have higher economic growth than non-democra2c countries. The
primary reason for this theory is that democracy and capitalism are mostly the two sides of the same
coin. Thus, democra2c countries can promote economic growth easier than authoritarian regimes. Most
developed countries adopt to democracy while there are a lot of developing countries which do not have
democra2c poli2cal ins2tu2on and adopt authoritarian regimes. For example, most countries in Middle
East do not adopt democracy and overall GDP is not as high as developed countries like the US and
European countries. However, some Middle Eastern countries that have rich oil resources are rela2vely
rich compared to other developing countries adop2ng democracy. In addi2on, the recent economic
development of China should not be overlooked. Although China does not adopt to democracy, GDP of
China is the second largest in the world following the US. This is because China started adop2ng
capitalism while maintaining authoritarian poli2cal ins2tu2on. Therefore, just being a democra2c state
does not seem to directly lead to the high economic growth. Based on ques2ons above, I would like to
measure how democracy inﬂuences economic well-being, considering other variables that should be
controlled. I used sta2s2cs indica2ng the rela2on between democracy and GDP per capita from IBM SPSS
Sta2s2cs.

Research Material & Method

Based on the arguments above, I would like to measure the relationship between the level of
democracy and economic development statistically by using IBM SPSS Statistics Software.
Actual numbers from statistics can measure whether hypotheses are correct or not. This
hypothesis can be confirmed by running regression analysis. I chose Dem_level4 as the
dependent variable. The label of this variable is “regime type.” This variable is coded 1 as full
democracy, 2 as part democracy, 3 as hybrid regime, and 4 as authoritarian. In other words,
the more regimes are close to democracy, the less numbers are coded. I chose this variable
because there are many kinds of regime types besides democracy and non-democracy today,
unlike when Lipset was alive. I used GDPpcap08 as the independent variable. This is an
interval variable that represents GDP per capita by US dollar. Since there are more than just
two dependent variables, the linear regression analysis should be used. In this linear
regression analysis, the null hypothesis is that GDP per capita does not have significant
impacts on regime types. The result of the linear regression analysis is below.
Coefficientsa
Standardized
Unstandardized Coefficients

Objectives

The idea of the modernization theory goes back to “some Social Requisite of democracy: Economic
Development and Political Legitimacy” written by Seymour Martin Lipset (Diamond, 2006). The impact of
this article was huge because Lipset was the first person who clearly stated that “the more well-to-do a
nation, the greater the chances it will sustain democracy” (Lipset, 1959, p. 75) even though there were
still a number of colonial countries in Asia and Africa in that era. Lipset compares between European
countries and Latin American regarding education, urbanization, industrialization, and the level of
democracy. He particularly emphasizes on the importance of education. In terms of education, the lowest
literacy rate in Europe, which is a completely democratic region, is 96% while in Latin America, which has
some dictatorial states, is 46%. Overall, Lipset came up with the idea that there are strong relationships
between economic development and democracy.
There are some counter arguments against Lipset’s modernization theory. Przeworski and Limongi
claim that the modernization theory is not the correct theory (Przeworski & Limongi, 1997). They use
GDP per capita to measure countries’ economic development. They criticize Lipest’s claim that
democracy can be achieved by economic development under dictatorships. If this hypothesis is correct,
dictatorial countries move to democratic states when they attain enough GDP per capita to change
political institutions. Indeed, the regime transformation from dictatorship to democracy is likely to occur
if countries achieve more than $6000 GDP per capita. If countries succeed in earning more than $6000
GDP per capita, they tend to maintain stable democratic institutions. However, countries earning less
than $6000 GDP per capita are unlikely to succeed in regime transitions. In other words, they argue that
democracy is not caused by development under authoritarian regimes and is caused exogenously, not
endogenously. In fact, only 19 out of 123 dictatorial states developed and achieved modernization.
Furthermore, some countries achieved economic development under authoritarian regimes. Przeworski
and Limongi raise some dictatorial countries, such as Singapore and Malaysia, arguing that they have
developed their economy for a long time although they have maintained authoritarian regimes. Simply
put, Przeworski and Limongi conclude that the modernization theory can only apply to rich countries,
whose GDP per capita is more than $6000, and cannot apply to other countries.
Moreover, Lipset overlooks the different process of state formation between Europe and other
developing countries. European countries were made by wars (Schwarz, 2008). States need to collect
money to go to wars, so European countries developed democratic institution for taxation. Thus,the
modernization theory can apply to Europe. On the other hand, state formation in third world countries is
not because of wars. They were artificially made by western countries. Although most countries have
achieved independence from colonialism by western countries, the influence of colonialism is strong
even after the independence. For example, the boarder between Iraq and Kuwait were drawn based on
interest of European countries to enjoy natural resources in Kuwait. As a result, Saddam Hussein caused
the Gulf War in 1991, claiming that Kuwait should have been the part of Iraq. This example indicates that
state formation in third world is unstable compared to that in European countries. Therefore,
modernization theory cannot apply to third world countries because the assumption of state formation is
different from that of European countries.
Although most wealthy countries adopt both capitalism and democracy, these two factors do not
always stick together. Some examples are countries in the Middle East who have rich oil resources, called
rentier states, like Saudi Arabia. Rentier states maintain relatively higher economies compared to other
developing countries although they are controlled by authoritarian regimes (Luciani, 2016). This is
because rentier states do not need democratic social contracts with their population. Since rentier states
can earn money by selling oil, they do not need to collect money from their population. Thus, they do not
have to levy taxation on people. They make social contract with their citizens through money from oil
revenue. Another good example of non-democratic emerging nation is China. China has maintained
communism even after the end of the Cold War. Although GDP per capita of China is still under
developing, recent economic development of China is apparent. The existence of a communist country
adopting capitalism questions the conventional view that democracy and capitalism are the two sides of
the same coin. These examples indicate that the correlations between democracy and economic growth
cannot apply to all countries.
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a. Dependent Variable: Regime type (Economist 2014)

“B” means the estimation of GDP/capita and the constant. The regression equation for
estimating the effect on GDP per capita on the level of democracy is
Regime types = 3.154 – 3.453 GDP/capita
This result indicates that there is a 3.453 unit decrease in the level of regime types for each
one-unit increase in GDP per capita. P-value for GDP per capita is .000, which is less than
.050. This means that null hypothesis should be rejected. In other words, there are strong
relationships between regime types and GDP per capita. This result seems to mean that
Lipset’s modernization theory, there are significant relations between democracies and
economic development, is proved and the critics of Lipset’s argument are rejected.
Nonetheless, this result does not mean that the modernization theory is completely
proved. This is because there might be some other factors that should be controlled to
analyze the relations between regime types and GDP per capita. As mentioned before, there
should be some elements that could be against the modernization theory. I would like to
control the level of human development and the level of oil production. I added human
development because it is what Lipset emphasizes on: education. If more people in a country
get good education, the level of human development increases proportionally because they
can learn how to develop themselves through education. Oil production can be related to
rentier states, which are not democratic states. As mentioned before, rentier states, which
can get money from revenue of the selling of oil, do not have to make democratic
institutions. By controlling human development and oil production, there could be different
results from the simple linear regression analysis between regime types and economic
growths.
I run another linear regression analysis between GDP per capita and regime types,
controlling human development and rentier states. From the same SPSS’s World.sav, I use
HDI, which is an interval variable for the measure of human development, and oil, which is
also an interval variable. HDI is coded one as the maximum human development and
indicates the level of human development by specific numbers. Oil production shows the
level of oil production by barrel per day. These are the controlled independent variables that
should be included in the analysis in addition to GDPpcap 08, another independent variable,
and Dem_level4, a dependent variable. The null hypothesis is that GDP per capita does not
have a strong influence on the level of democracy, controlling the level of human
development and oil production. I run the linear regression analysis, us ing all of these
variables. The results are the following:
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a. Dependent Variable: Regime type (Economist 2014)

There is a 9.236 unit decrease in GDP per capita for each one-unit increase in the
regime types. Every 2me the level of regime types increases by one unit, there is
a 3.190 decrease in human development. There is a 1.673 increase in oil
produc2on every 2me the level of regime types increases by one unit. For each Pvalue is .156 for GDP per capita, .000 for human development, and .000 for oil
produc2on. Since .156 is more than .050, it is concluded that there are not
signiﬁcant rela2ons between regime types and GDP per capita. On the other
hand, human development and oil produc2on have signiﬁcant impacts on regime
types because both have .000 P-values, which are less than .050. In other words,
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected if human development and oil produc2on
are controlled. Therefore, the moderniza2on theory presented by Lipset cannot
be proved. However, I should not overlook the other factors from this result
besides the null hypothesis. The strong rela2onship between human
development and regime types implies that educa2on takes an important role in
regime types. The coeﬃcients say that there are fewer human developments in
higher number of regime types, which means less democra2c regimes. The
signiﬁcant rela2on between oil produc2on and regime types represent the nature
of ren2er states. As men2oned before, ren2er states do not need democra2c
ins2tu2ons as they can earn money from the revenue of selling of oil. The
coeﬃcients predict that more oil produc2on countries earn, the more likely that
they adopt authoritarian regimes. Simply put, the result of this linear regression
analysis rejects the moderniza2on theory and conveys that educa2on and oil take
signiﬁcant roles in regime types.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Lipset’s moderniza2on theory that there are strong rela2onships
between the level of democracy and economic development cannot apply to every
situa2on. Indeed, Lipset did signiﬁcant jobs to come up with the concept of
moderniza2on theory because moderniza2on theory can explain overall tendency
of rela2onships between democracy and economic development. In prac2ce, the
simple linear regression analysis between regime types and economic
development tells that they have strong rela2onships. However, Lipsets overlooks
some detailed factors that should be taken into account. Przeworski and Limongi
take signiﬁcant roles in cri2cizing Lipset’s theory. Since they use speciﬁc numbers
from a variety of sta2s2cs, their grounds of the cri2cs of the moderniza2on theory
is strong. Therefore, the combina2on of my regression analyses and arguments of
Przeworski and Limongi can be enough grounds to cri2cize Lipset’s claim. In fact,
the rela2onship between economic development and the level of democracy is
weak if I control human development and oil produc2on through the linear
regression analysis. One thing that was correct regarding Lipset’s arguments is that
educa2on has signiﬁcant impacts on democracies from the strong rela2ons
between human development and regime types. The strong rela2onship between
ren2er states and non-democra2c regimes is also proved through the analysis. This
result tells the reason why countries in the Middle East have failed to adopt to
democracy. Overall, moderniza2on theory is rejected.
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